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Triage Approaches Send Adverse
Political Signals for Conservation
Ralf C. Buckley*
School of Environment, Griffith University, Gold Coast, QLD, Australia
Conservation can be analyzed as a political game between advocates and opponents,
and games include signals. Triage approaches aim to trade off conservation gains and
losses for different species, populations and sites, in an attempt to reduce aggregate
net losses. These approaches send a political signal that some local or global species
extinctions are socially acceptable. This permits conservation opponents to argue
that any species may become extinct where convenient to development interests.
Endorsement of triage by any one conservation advocate undermines the efforts and
strategies of other conservation advocates. This increases expected aggregate net
conservation losses.
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INTRODUCTION: GAME THEORY APPROACHES TO
CONSERVATION POLICY
The aims of biodiversity conservation relate to other species, but the practice of conservation is
a human sociopolitical process (Clark et al., 2015; Redford et al., 2015) which can be analyzed
using game theory (Simon et al., 1950), as for other politically controversial environmental
measures (Buckley, 2013a). Games include signals, either deliberate or inadvertent, accurate or
deceptive (Denicolo, 2008; McCain, 2010). The game is played between advocates who consider
conservation a high priority, and opponents who do not (Buckley, 2015). Some opponents are
declared and explicit, e.g., regarding livestock predators. Many more are undeclared and implicit,
interested in economic gain or material consumption irrespective of environmental impacts. Some
advocates endorse intrinsic values, pursue outsider politics, and reject compromise. Others endorse
instrumental values, pursue insider politics, and accept compromise. Advocate may adopt positions
anywhere on this spectrum.
In any game, successful players need power and strategy. Political power is gained either through
force, funds or votes, with variable exchange rates. Conservation advocates rely on votes to change
policies and legislation. They aim to enlist popular support in marginal electorates, or appeal
to politicians who hold a balance of power. To enlist supporters, conservation advocates appeal
to either intrinsic or instrumental interests. Intrinsic-value appeals yield “warmglow” payback,
immediate but restricted (Martín-López et al., 2007). Instrumental-value appeals provide broader
but delayed and uncertain payback.
Conservation practice is driven and constrained by legislation, derived from past politics.
Countries with different legislation have implicitly adopted different positions. Strict protection
reflects intrinsic values, derived from culture or religion (Haynes, 2008; Smidt et al., 2009;
Norris and Inglehart, 2011). Conditional protection, e.g., through trade-offs or offsets, reflect
instrumentalist approaches. Different approaches may be either more or less effective under
different conditions.
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There are shifting alliances between players, and subsidiary
games within coalitions. Mining interests, manufacturers of
motorized recreational vehicles, and a horseriding association
combined to oppose roadless-areas legislation in the USA
(Havlick, 2002; McBeth et al., 2007; Wolke, 2007). In November
2015, a US-based hunting organization apparently held closed-
door talks with the South African Government to oppose
conservation through CITES (Africa Geographic, 2015).
Conservation advocates also form coalitions, with
differentiated political positions to attract complementary
supporters. If conservation advocates adopt conflicting strategies,
however, the political split can be exploited by conservation
opponents. One strategy for conservation opponents is to
engineer such a split deliberately. Persuading one well-regarded
advocate to oppose the majority sends a political signal of
doubt and confusion. This is the strategy used by climate-change
denialists, and opponents of many science-based policy measures
(Beder, 2002).
If any conservation analysts and advocates endorse triage, that
creates political signals that damage the effectiveness of other
conservation organizations. Advocating triage reduces future
resources for conservation, and this outweighs any gains from
efficient allocation of current resources. I examine this process
for triage of species, subpopulations, and sites.
TRIAGE OF SPECIES
Triage of species means abandoning some to extinction, and
allocating resources to those where extinction can be averted
most cheaply. This contrasts with the approach adopted under
most threatened-species legislation, which invests most on
species closest to extinction, even if this is costly and sometimes
fails.
Triage of species suffers from both technical and political
shortcomings. There is no scientific threshold to abandon a
species to inevitable extinction. With active conservation, some
species have recovered from very small remnant populations
(Jachowski and Kesler, 2008) or a single breeding pair (Jones
et al., 1995). Some have survived in the wild for many decades,
at very low numbers, after being believed extinct (Meijaard
and Nijman, 2014). Species may be rescuable from a single
individual, or even a dead specimen (Minteer, 2014). There
is thus no scientific rationale to abandon any species as
irremediably doomed. Doom derives less from the genetics of
small populations, and more from economics and continuing
anthropogenic threats. These are powerful real-world political
constraints (Game et al., 2013; Doak et al., 2014), but not
impossibilities.
The political shortcoming is that acceptance of triage by
any one conservation advocate sends a powerful signal that
modifies the entire political playing field. The current global
social norm is that all species are invaluable, and any extinction
is a loss to all humanity. The current political norm is that
extinctions are highly abnormal and regrettable events, that
sometimes occur despite our best efforts to avoid them. These
norms are embodied in government policy and legislation,
agency mandates and budgets, and in the practical politics of
social license. Countries which have legislation and associated
litigation mandating protection of threatened species, send a
strong political signal that development or land use change likely
to lead to species extinction will be difficult and expensive to
achieve. This influences how industry groups, with no interest
in conservation, decide what developments to pursue. If such
protection is conditional, through trade-offs or offsets, this signal
is far weaker, since it is much easier to influence politicians than
to overcome definitively worded legislation (Buckley, 1991a).
Opponents of conservation do not currently possess a
social license to declare that extinctions are unimportant. They
argue only that in limited local circumstances, other social
benefits may outweigh impacts on particular populations of
threatened species. Livestock graziers generally do not argue
that predator species should become extinct. They claim only
that they, or government agricultural agencies, should kill
individual predators that might attack their livestock (Rust,
2015). Mineral and petroleum developers, and forestry agencies
and corporations, do not claim openly that threatened species
are unimportant, because they must comply with legislation and
with current social constraints and political norms. They do,
however, attempt to change these norms. In consultations for a
previous Australian Government’s policy papers on sustainable
development, for example (Buckley, 1991b) one mining industry
representative suggested that in his view, 10% of Australia’s
species could become extinct in the interests of mineral
production.
Under species-triage approaches, extinctions would be
perceived as a normal part of a human-dominated planet. Laws
and agencies shift from attempting to avoid any extinctions
at all, to choosing between different extinctions on economic
grounds (New SouthWales, 2014). Species extinctions are treated
like business bankruptcies. If the timescales, discount rates and
uncertainty measures used in calculating economic paybacks
were the same as for commercial investments or government
infrastructure, then triage could soon leave us with no other
species than those in current commercial use. This political
change far outweighs any potential conservation gains through
more efficient allocation of current funds under current political
systems.
Advocates of species triage argue that some extinctions are
unavoidable, and that fixed, limited and fully fungible resources
are therefore best allocated where they are most likely to
yield the largest conservation benefit. That is, they perceive
conservation essentially as an economic optimization problem;
and they act as though politics, society, and legislation are
a fixed framework, and they are merely tweaking their own
operations within that framework. This is incorrect. Advocating
triage changes the entire framework. The current conservation
view is that extinctions are abnormal anthropogenic events
that occur despite conservation efforts, and that conservation
efforts should therefore improve. The triage view is that
extinctions are normal events within the functioning of a
human-dominated planet: a very different position. If it is
seen as acceptable to conservationists that one species should
become extinct, that signals that it is equally acceptable
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for other species to become extinct (Jachowski and Kesler,
2008). This jeopardizes the position of other conservation
advocates. In purely pragmatic terms, triage is a poor
gambit.
TRIAGE OF POPULATIONS
Many threatened species occur at multiple separate sites. Two
terminologies are in use to describe geographically separated
groups of individuals. Analyses of population viability and
genetics generally refer to site-specific populations, which may
or may not experience any genetic linkage, and in aggregate
comprise a larger-scale (e.g., global) meta-population. That is, the
key consideration is generally the genetic flow between different
groups of individuals. Analyses of conservation status based on
number of individuals remaining, in contrast, commonly refer
to a global population divided into individual subpopulations.
The key consideration is commonly the boundary of site-specific
conservation management efforts. These two considerations are
both important in practical conservation. For convenience, I will
refer to geographically distinct groups as populations.
Triage at this scale involves abandoning some groups
of individuals to extinction in order to focus resources on
conserving other groups within the same species. That is, it
aims to conserve some individuals of a threatened species, but
not others. Since detailed information on population genetics
and conservation threats to individual groups is rarely available,
triage approaches at population scale focus on estimated
numbers of individuals, geographical locations, and estimated
management costs. They argue for concentrating conservation
resources on populations which are: larger; nearer the center of
the species’ range; and cheaper to manage, either for reasons of
terrain, biology or politics (New South Wales, 2014).
There are both technical and political objections to this
approach. The principal technical objection is that smaller
outlying populations may be genetically diverse or distinct from
larger subpopulations near the center of a species’ range. Without
detailed data on population genetics, rarely available in practice,
abandoning outlying populations to extinction leads to the
risk of losing a larger proportion of a species’ overall genetic
diversity, than loss of a corresponding number of individuals
within a larger and more central population. That is, small
outlying populations should be considered more rather than less
valuable for conservation. This is indeed the approach taken in
most practical conservation efforts, but not in population-triage
approaches.
The second technical objection is that, especially for
threatened species with few individuals remaining, there is
always the risk of catastrophic events devastating particular local
populations. Such events may be natural, anthropogenic, or a
combination. Examples include: disease outbreaks; fires or floods;
legal or illegal habitat clearance or destruction; poaching, hunting
or harvesting; or war or other armed conflict. It is because of such
risks that practical species conservation programs devote efforts
and resources to translocating individuals so as to establish or re-
establish breeding populations in multiple areas well separated
from each other. There are many such programs currently in
place (Rhinos Without Borders, 2015). These are measures to
reduce the all-eggs-one-basket risk. Triage of populations, in
contrast, increases that risk.
The political objection to population-scale triage is that it
legitimizes gradual reductions in species range and number of
individuals, which reduces the species’ ability to maintain a
viable population overall and to recover from any short-term
reductions. The current legal, social and political norm is that if
a species is threatened, every individual of that species is equally
protected from “take or harm” (McDonald and Buckley, 1993).
Controversies, e.g., over the consequences of trophy hunting
(Buckley, 2014), are about mechanisms, not aims.
Population triage approaches, however, signal that it is legally,
socially, and politically acceptable for some of the remaining
individuals of a threatened species to be destroyed, as long
as others remain in existence. That provides an avenue for
commercial interests to take or harm individuals, whether
through fisheries bycatch, logging or agriculture, clearance for
industrial, infrastructure, mineral or residential development, or
any other human activity. Once population triage approaches
are adopted, the number of remaining individuals can suffer
continual attrition, until there is a viable wild breeding
population with sufficient size, range and genetic diversity to
resisting external shocks.
TRIAGE OF SITES
Site-based triage approaches abandon some conservation areas to
focus resources on others. Many decision rules are possible, using
different measures of biodiversity and land tenure. Information
is commonly incomplete, especially when “rapid appraisal” is
adopted. Prioritizing areas for future conservation is unavoidable
(Bottrill et al., 2008), but that is very different from triage of
existing conservation areas.
The key issue relates to the conservation value of land
subject to anthropogenic modifications. Areas that are no longer
pristine can make significant contributions to conservation:
e.g., if they still support threatened species and ecosystems not
well conserved elsewhere; or if they can be rehabilitated and
restocked; or if they provide corridors linking other areas of
high conservation value. For some species, the only remaining
populations occur on modified landscapes. So, there are indeed
cases where it is valuable to invest in conservation of modified as
well as pristine ecosystems (Rappaport et al., 2015). Conservation
trusts and NGOs can justifiably devote funds, on occasion,
to purchasing private farmland. Conservation advocates can
justifiably lobby to convert former farming and forestry lands, or
waters used for fisheries, to future conservation reserves.
The risk to conservation occurs when this argument is
used instead to lobby for social license to create conservation
damage to areas that are still pristine. This lobbying approach
is used frequently when economic interests want to use current
conservation reserves for development, or infrastructure, or
large-scale tourism. These interests argue that whilst their actions
would indeed create impacts, the land would still be valuable
for conservation, just like anthropogenically modified lands
elsewhere. This is also the basis for biodiversity offset approaches.
The relationship between physical modification to the natural
environment and loss in biodiversity conservation value,
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however, is non-linear. Initial damage to pristine ecosystems is
rapid and large, whereas recovery of modified ecosystems is slow
and limited, a hysteresis effect (Buckley, 1982).
These relationships also differ greatly between ecosystems
and types of anthropogenic modification. Grasslands used
for low-intensity livestock grazing can be rehabilitated and
restocked as conservation reserves for native herbivores and
their predators (Varty and Buchanan, 2000; Lewa Wildlife
Conservancy, 2015). Cutting roads or power lines through
rainforest reserves, in contrast, causes fragmentation of the forest
canopy, introduction of invasive species and pathogens, and
access by high-impact human recreationists. Politicians, however,
have wrongly attempted to argue from grassland to rainforest
(Buckley, 2013b).
Landscapes differ by orders of magnitude in human
modification. Where human modification is minimal,
conservation aims to keep areas pristine. Park managers
confine human modification to front-country areas so as to
maintain pristine backcountry. Other factors equal, minimally
modified lands have higher conservation value than heavily
modified lands. The political signal from triage of conservation
sites, however, is that if human-modified landscapes are
valuable for conservation, there is no barrier to modifying
pristine landscapes. If one conservation advocate argues that
all landscapes are already modified, this gives conservation
opponents a political license to modify wilderness: as attempted
unsuccessfully by the Australian Government in the Tasmanian
Wilderness World Heritage Area (International Union for
Conservation of Nature (IUCN), 2014).
Similar objections apply to proposals that parks agencies could
sell some of the lands under their control and buy larger areas
elsewhere (Fuller et al., 2010; Venter et al., 2014). Parks agencies
operate with annual recurrent funding from central government
treasuries. If they sell land, the revenues earned are appropriated
by central treasuries, not allocated to buy new parks. Areas
proposed for sale and purchase are in different jurisdictions,
with no mechanism to transfer funds between governments.
If parks agencies buy and sell land, this changes land prices,
reducing the total area purchasable. This effect occurs whenever
news of proposed purchases reaches landowners. That is why
land consolidators use secret intermediaries to purchase adjacent
properties. It is also one reason why parks agencies find it so
difficult to create corridors between parks by buying private
land. Once they start negotiations, all landowners increase prices.
Their lands are more valuable to parks agencies, which need
parcels in specific sites, than in the open private market with
greater substitutability.
DISCUSSION
The political-signal argument against triage is a pragmatist rather
than a fundamentalist approach. There are parallel moral and
ethical arguments against triage (Callicott and Grove-Fanning,
2009; Soulé, 2013; Cafaro and Primack, 2014), but those
are different. My argument is that if any one well-regarded
conservation organization or analyst endorses triage, that sends
TABLE 1 | Good intentions, adverse signals.
Triage scale Triage advocates’ intent Inadvertent political signal
Species Minimize total species extinctions Species extinctions no longer a
barrier to commercial
development
Population Prioritize effort to larger
populations
Threatened species legislation
no longer a barrier to commercial
development
Site Prioritize resources to sites with
highest conservation values
Parks open for commercial
development
a political signal which changes the social norms regarding
conservation, greatly increasing the barriers to effective action by
other conservation advocates. This effect occurs at all scales of
triage: species, populations, and sites.
These signals are inadvertent. Conservation analysts and
advocates who endorse triage are no doubt well-intentioned,
and believe that their proposals will contribute to conservation
by allocating resources more efficiently. That is, they focus
on choosing between different potential uses of limited funds
provided to protected area agencies through annual government
budget allocations.
In doing so, however, they create negative consequences
for conservation by weakening the defenses of parks agencies,
and non-government conservation advocates, against continual
attacks by other interests. Such interests see conservation as an
obstacle to commercial profit, and parks as resources available
far more cheaply than corresponding private lands. Their actions
are restricted by threatened species legislation and agencies, and
they campaign continually to weaken both. Triage approaches
provide large loopholes that are rapidly exploited by commercial
interests, which are always in competition for new opportunities,
and always engaged in political maneuvers to gain advantage.
The ways which triage approaches are perceived by their
advocates are thus very different from the ways in which they
are perceived by conservation opponents. These contrasts are
summarized in Table 1.
Politics is ultimately a subset of animal behavior. It is a term
to describe the ways in which humans gain and apply the power
to change social structures in line with their own interests and
desires. Many animal species form shifting social alliances; many
also deceive each other and sometimes fight each other. I argue
here that conservation is a political game, and that conservation
efforts are unlikely to succeed unless conservation advocates
recognize this, and design strategies accordingly. Games involve
signals, either accurate or deceptive. I argue here that if any
conservation analyst or advocate adopts triage approaches, that
endorsement sends political signals that create damaging effects,
and that damage far outweighs any gains which may be achieved
through more efficient allocation of resources.
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